Attackers used Qubole’s AWS account to read customer environments
Short answer
Wiz reported on November 9, 2026, and updated the post on November 11, that a threat actor used IAM credentials from AWS account 805246085872, which Wiz observes Qubole’s platform using, to assume customer integration roles between October 14 and October 26, 2026. Every attributed AssumeRole call included an External ID and succeeded. Inside those accounts the actor read Lambda environment variables, Secrets Manager, and SSM parameters, validated credentials with TruffleHog, and downloaded S3 objects from whatever buckets the role could reach. Wiz does not say how the Qubole credentials were first stolen, and it does not give a victim count.
Last updated · Sekrd Research
- When: role assumptions observed October 14–26, 2026. Wiz post by Zack Morrow, Sean Johnstone, and Benjamin Read, November 9, updated November 11.
- Who: activity from AWS account 805246085872, which Wiz says Qubole’s platform uses. Wiz worked with Sentra and Mandiant. A November 11 note says Risky Business reported a claim of responsibility by an actor calling themselves n0n. Wiz has not tied the campaign to other public activity.
- Impact: multiple customer AWS environments. Secrets read from Lambda, Secrets Manager, and SSM. S3 objects downloaded, in some cases an entire bucket in one session. No victim total is stated.
- Root cause Wiz describes: customer roles that trust the vendor account, including roles that were otherwise unused. The initial theft of the vendor credentials is not explained.
- Separate activity: October 8–11, customer-owned access keys Wiz believes were created for Qubole. Not linked to the role-assumption campaign.
What happened
Qubole is a data platform that runs inside a customer’s AWS account by assuming a role the customer created. On November 9, 2026, Wiz described a threat actor using IAM users in the AWS account Qubole’s platform uses, 805246085872, to call AssumeRole on those customer roles. The window is October 14 through October 26. Sentra saw suspicious activity in several customer environments, called it a supply-chain attack, and brought Wiz in. Mandiant is named as part of the same investigation. Wiz does not say whether the vendor credentials have been disabled, and the post does not quote a statement from Qubole or its parent company.
The actor was not breaking into AWS as a service. Customers had already allowed that account to assume a role, usually with an External ID condition. Every AssumeRole Wiz attributed to the threat actor included an External ID, and every one succeeded. In a majority of the environments Wiz looked at, those calls were the only AssumeRole activity from the vendor account during October. The roles were still trusted, so the requests worked.
Timeline
- October 8–11. A separate set of activity, not linked by Wiz to the role assumptions: an actor tested customer-owned access keys that Wiz believes were created for Qubole integrations. On October 8 the keys were tested within a single hour. In a small number of cases the actor went on to compromise the victim’s environment.
- October 14. First attributed AssumeRole, from Mullvad address 45.83.220.211, using IAM user AIDA3W7DIFLYOLTK63SFS. Wiz says it has not seen that user in any other activity.
- October 15 onward. Most activity from OVH address 57.129.54.120.
- October 18. A second IAM user, AIDAJYRRH5Y3A7AAJM2HW, which also carries legitimate Qubole traffic from AWS infrastructure. A second Mullvad address, 185.209.199.73, assumed roles across multiple environments in quick succession.
- Through October 26. Enumeration, secret collection, TruffleHog validation, and S3 downloads. Session names used the prefix
quiam-, includingquiam-enumandquiam-scope-full. - November 11. Wiz added that Catalin Cimpanu of the Risky Business newsletter reported an actor calling themselves “n0n” had claimed responsibility. Wiz says the theft looks opportunistic and that it has no direct insight into motive.
What the actor did after the role assumption
The role session was the customer’s role, with the permissions the customer had attached for the vendor. Wiz says the actor listed buckets, objects, databases, tables, instances, security groups, VPCs, DB snapshots, roles, and KMS keys. It then went to the places credentials usually sit. GetFunctionConfiguration returns a Lambda function’s environment variables. GetSecretValue returns Secrets Manager secrets. GetParameter returns SSM parameters.
TruffleHog was used to test what those calls returned. The credentials belonged to the victim organizations, not to Qubole. On AWS, TruffleHog called GetCallerIdentity, which needs no permissions and shows whether a key works. On Entra ID it signed in as service principals with discovered client secrets. On Okta it requested tokens with discovered client credentials. Wiz says the AWS checks came in bursts lasting seconds.
S3 reads followed AssumeRole, ListBuckets, ListObjects and HeadObject, then GetObject. The actor read what the role could reach and sometimes downloaded a whole bucket in one session. Management events show the assumption and the listing, not object reads. Those need data events. Wiz says several environments lacked them.
Wiz also found an ISO named sso_agent.iso on 57.129.54.120, SHA-256 65f061281c9a712e9502793dc4c5035cae490b84da05f7d4223cefa65ad396e4. It says the image was not confirmed deployed.
How to check if your app is exposed
- If you ever created a role for Qubole, open CloudTrail from October 1, 2026 in every account that holds that role. Wiz’s filters: AssumeRole where
userIdentity.accountIdis 805246085872 and the source IP is not an AWS address. Legitimate platform traffic Wiz saw came from AWS infrastructure. - Treat any use of principal AIDA3W7DIFLYOLTK63SFS as worth investigating. For AIDAJYRRH5Y3A7AAJM2HW, filter out AWS-sourced calls, because that user also serves normal platform traffic.
- If you find a session, read everything it did next, especially Secrets Manager, SSM, Lambda configuration, and S3. Rotate every secret, parameter, and Lambda environment variable that role could read. Revoke active sessions for the role. Rotating a key does not end a temporary session that was already issued.
- Delete integration roles you no longer use. Wiz says many victim environments had no legitimate vendor traffic during October, and the trust policy still accepted the calls. Where the vendor supports it, trust a specific principal rather than the account root, and add a source-network condition. Wiz says a source IP condition alone would have blocked every role assumption it observed. Do not treat the External ID as a secret. It is logged in CloudTrail.
- A vendor role that can read every secret is the same class of standing trust as the ConnectWise backup app the same month: that write-up.
How Sekrd helps
Sekrd does not read your AWS CloudTrail or your IAM trust policies. It reads the site you ship. A deep scan reports a public bucket linked from the page when the listing names a credential or database object, and it reports a real .env file or /.git/HEAD when the body matches. Those rules are described in the November scanner update. A secret key compiled into the frontend is js-client-secret-env.
If Qubole, or any similar integration, was pointed at an app you generated with Lovable, Bolt, Cursor, v0, or Replit, the thing to scan is still the URL users open. A vendor role in AWS and a service-role key in a JavaScript bundle are different doors. Check both. Free scan for the bundle. Deep scan when the page references cloud storage.
Related reading
Frequently asked questions
What did Wiz say the Qubole attacker accessed?
Customer IAM roles trusted to AWS account 805246085872. After assuming them, the actor read Lambda environment variables, Secrets Manager secrets, and SSM parameters, checked credentials with TruffleHog, and downloaded S3 objects the role could list. Wiz does not publish a victim count.
When did the Qubole role-assumption activity happen?
Wiz dates it from October 14 through October 26, 2026. A separate, unlinked use of customer-owned access keys ran from October 8 to October 11.
Did the External ID stop the attack?
No. Wiz says every attributed AssumeRole request included an External ID and every one succeeded. The post says the External ID is logged in CloudTrail and should not be the only control.
Who claimed responsibility?
Wiz’s November 11 update says Catalin Cimpanu of Risky Business reported that an actor calling themselves n0n claimed responsibility. Wiz says it has not identified ties to other public activity and does not have direct insight into motive.
Does Sekrd detect a malicious AssumeRole?
No. That evidence is in CloudTrail. Sekrd scans a public URL for leaked keys, open databases, and a small set of read-only probes. It does not connect to your AWS account unless you are looking at the deployed app.
Sources
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