A ConnectWise Cloud Backup credential was used inside Microsoft 365 tenants
Short answer
On October 17, 2026, ConnectWise shut down Cloud Backup, formerly SkyKick, after unauthorized use of its application credentials against Microsoft 365 tenants. Huntress said that as of 19:00 UTC on October 16 it had confirmed unauthorized sign-ins in 162 tenants, starting October 15 from 144.172.64.128. ConnectWise disabled seven application identities at 07:00 UTC on October 17 and said that does not change each tenant’s local configuration, and that previously issued tokens can keep working until they expire. Stored backup archives were described as encrypted, with no evidence they were accessed.
Last updated · Sekrd Research
- When: malicious sign-ins observed October 15, 2026. ConnectWise announced the shutdown at 05:01 UTC on October 17 and disabled seven app identities at 07:00 UTC. BleepingComputer’s report is October 17. ConnectWise’s remediation guide is dated October 18.
- Application: ConnectWise Cloud Backup, formerly SkyKick, client ID 506e08f9-6e9a-4da4-942b-a099a03644ae. Six related Cloud Management app IDs are in the vendor guide.
- Scale Huntress stated: unauthorized sign-ins in 162 tenants as of 19:00 UTC on October 16. Huntress also saw directory-role assignment, mostly Exchange Administrator, on nearly 50 tenants it monitors.
- Backups: ConnectWise said it had no indicators that partner backup data was compromised. The October 18 update said archives stayed encrypted and isolated, and that SaaS Security and Cloud Management were taken offline as a precaution.
- Not established: BleepingComputer reported that the victim total, the extent of data theft, and the method used to obtain the vendor credential were still unclear at publication.
What happened
ConnectWise Cloud Backup exists so a managed service provider can copy a customer’s Microsoft 365 mail, files, and Teams data. To do that, each customer tenant consents to an application. On October 15, 2026, that application’s identity signed in from somewhere it normally does not. Huntress’s October 16 write-up says the sign-ins came from 144.172.64.128, used a client assertion, and received Microsoft Graph tokens. A client assertion means the credential lives in the vendor’s tenant. Huntress says nothing a customer did in their own tenant could have produced it.
BleepingComputer, reporting October 17, quotes ConnectWise: the company had “recently identified unauthorized access to application identities within the ConnectWise Cloud Backup environment,” and it had “no indicators to date that Cloud Backup partner backup data has been compromised.” Microsoft, cited in that article, confirmed unauthorized authentication attempts from an IP address on October 15 and described Graph reconnaissance plus attempts to add credentials. Huntress’s own page is the source for the count of 162 tenants with unauthorized sign-ins as of 19:00 UTC on October 16.
Timeline
- October 13–14. Huntress, via BleepingComputer, linked the same IP to scripted sign-in attempts with user agent curl/7.88.1. ConnectWise’s guide says to review from October 13, and further back to October 1 where logs exist.
- October 15. Broad service-principal authentication from 144.172.64.128. Huntress names the credential type as a client assertion.
- October 16, 19:00 UTC. Huntress: unauthorized sign-ins confirmed in 162 tenants. In one partner tenant, Cloud Management - MS Teams (24205314-2b89-4e07-a2a4-579e898a5640) gave itself Global Administrator and added credentials to two other applications, one of them a Huntress app unique to that partner.
- October 17, 05:01 UTC. BleepingComputer says ConnectWise announced the service interruption. At 07:00 UTC ConnectWise disabled seven application identities and revoked their credentials.
- October 18, 01:00 UTC. Update quoted by BleepingComputer: scheduled backups not running, archive access and restores unavailable, SaaS Security and Cloud Management offline as a precaution. “The affected shared Cloud Backup credentials are no longer valid. Previously issued access tokens may remain usable until they expire or are otherwise invalidated.”
What a consented app can do once its secret leaks
Todyl, quoted by BleepingComputer, said the attacker signed in as the backup application using its secret. Prior consent allowed reading and writing mail, OneDrive, SharePoint, and Teams. In nine tenants Todyl found only sign-ins, not new accounts or persistence through the backup app.
Huntress saw a second stage on nearly 50 tenants: Cloud Management apps for Exchange Online, Teams, and Microsoft Graph assigned themselves directory roles, mostly Exchange Administrator. In the one tenant described above, persistence took about five minutes and included a Global Administrator assignment. Microsoft’s account, as relayed by BleepingComputer, was reconnaissance and attempts to add credentials after the service-principal sign-in. Those three descriptions can all be true for different tenants. None of them is a complete inventory of mail that was copied.
Disabling the vendor identity does not finish the job. ConnectWise’s October 18 guide says vendor-side revocation does not change the enterprise application inside each tenant, and previously issued tokens may keep working until they expire. Credentials added to other apps have to be removed locally. Todyl, quoted by BleepingComputer, says disabling an app stops new tokens and that revoking user sessions does not end application access. MFA did not apply, because the sign-in was the application.
How to check if your app is exposed
- Do this in every tenant you administer, including dormant connections and customers reached through a reseller. ConnectWise says reviewing your own tenant does not review the customer’s. Sign in at entra.microsoft.com and record the tenant ID.
- Find these application IDs under Enterprise applications. Match the ID, not the display name. Older installs may still say SkyKick. The seven IDs in the October 18 guide are 506e08f9-6e9a-4da4-942b-a099a03644ae, 2399d300-6fca-4e6a-a686-399fefe75b83, 24205314-2b89-4e07-a2a4-579e898a5640, b78f6a77-d4e5-46fb-87e5-d1648bd02519, 0de14c77-b9b0-4137-9360-34878a929827, 412dcf96-176d-4b3a-a1b0-4981ad66971e, and b2b55f5b-7758-4719-8d8f-88ae172e6bdb.
- If an affected app is still enabled for sign-in, set that to No. Do not delete it as the first step. ConnectWise says to preserve the configuration as evidence. Record the object ID and the time in UTC.
- In sign-in logs from October 13 onward, filter service-principal sign-ins for those app IDs and for 144.172.64.128. The guide also lists 144.172.64.99 and 144.172.64.60 as addresses that require investigation. User agents the guide and BleepingComputer mention include python-urllib/3.12, python-requests, and curl. A match is a lead, not proof of what was read.
- In audit logs, look for credentials added to any application, role assignments, and new consent grants. Huntress says disabling the ConnectWise apps does not remove credentials already added. Remove unauthorized secrets only after you have saved the metadata.
- If you build a SaaS product, this is the design question. A multi-tenant app with standing Graph consent is a credential to every customer who clicked Accept. Prefer short-lived, narrow permissions, and assume the app secret will leak. The Qubole write-up is the AWS version of the same trust: cross-account roles.
How Sekrd helps
Sekrd does not sign in to Microsoft 365 and does not audit Entra applications. It will not tell you whether a tenant consented to Cloud Backup. What it will tell you is whether the app you are about to ship has its own over-broad secret in the browser, an unsigned payment webhook, or a database the anonymous key can read. Those are the failures AI-built apps actually deploy. Rules: secret-pattern-match, payment-webhook-no-sig, supabase-rls-bypass.
After you finish the tenant review ConnectWise published, scan the product those tenants use. Free scan of the public URL. Comparisons with other reviewers are on /compare.
Related reading
Frequently asked questions
How many Microsoft 365 tenants did Huntress confirm?
Huntress’s October 16, 2026 post says that as of 19:00 UTC that day it had confirmed unauthorized sign-ins in 162 tenants. BleepingComputer’s later story says at least 162 in Huntress’s environment. Neither figure is a global victim count.
Did ConnectWise say backups were stolen?
No. ConnectWise said it had no indicators that partner backup data was compromised, and on October 18 said archives remained encrypted and isolated. BleepingComputer reported that the extent of data theft was still unclear.
Does disabling the app in the tenant end the attacker’s access?
ConnectWise and the researchers BleepingComputer quoted say previously issued tokens can remain usable until they expire, and that credentials added to other applications are a separate cleanup. Vendor-side revocation does not edit the customer tenant.
Which IP address should I search for?
144.172.64.128 is the address Huntress, Microsoft, and ConnectWise’s guide all discuss. The October 18 ConnectWise guide also lists 144.172.64.99 and 144.172.64.60 as addresses that require investigation.
Were other ConnectWise products confirmed compromised?
The October 18 update quoted by BleepingComputer says SaaS Security and Cloud Management were taken offline as a precaution, and that this should not be read as evidence a given customer environment was compromised. The initial advisory language BleepingComputer quoted was about Cloud Backup application identities.
Sources
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