tensorlake 0.5.144 on npm was a Shai-Hulud credential worm
Short answer
Tensorlake’s advisory GHSA-8g63-53c9-65j2 says that on October 8, 2026, npm version 0.5.144 of tensorlake was published from a compromised maintainer account through the project’s own release workflow, so the package carried valid npm provenance. It was live for about one hour and 40 minutes, from 01:12 to 02:54 UTC. A preinstall hook ran an obfuscated payload that stole GitHub, npm, cloud, and AI-tool credentials and could republish itself. It also installed a gh-token-monitor service that deletes the home directory if the stolen GitHub token is revoked. Remove that service before you rotate the token. PyPI and crates.io were not affected.
Last updated · Sekrd Research
- When: October 8, 2026, about 01:12–02:54 UTC. Advisory published the same day by calavera.
- Package: tensorlake 0.5.144 on npm, plus tensorlake-native-* at 0.5.144. Not an authorized release. PyPI, crates.io, and the tensorlake CLI were not affected.
- Provenance: the attacker pushed to the repository and published through Tensorlake’s own workflow, so the npm release had valid provenance.
- Payload: obfuscated JavaScript via a preinstall hook. Steals developer credentials, including AI tool and MCP configuration, and republishes into packages and repos the victim can write.
- Trap: a persistent service named gh-token-monitor deletes the home directory if the stolen GitHub token is revoked. Remove it first. 0.5.143 is unaffected. 0.5.145 is the later upgrade once published.
What happened
Tensorlake publishes an SDK for applications, sandboxes, and cloud services. On October 8, 2026, version 0.5.144 of the npm package was not theirs. The advisory says a compromised maintainer account pushed malicious code and the project’s release workflow published it. Because the workflow was the real one, the package carried valid npm provenance. Provenance told the truth about which workflow ran. It did not say the commit was authorized.
The package was on the registry for about one hour and 40 minutes, from 01:12 to 02:54 UTC. Tensorlake says it watches SDK usage through user-agent headers and had not seen this version used. That is not a count of developer machines that ran npm install during the window. The advisory does not give a download count for 0.5.144.
The same version number was published for the platform packages tensorlake-native-darwin-arm64, the linux gnu and musl builds, and tensorlake-native-win32-x64. The advisory says 0.5.143 and earlier are unaffected, and to move to 0.5.145 once that version exists. It tells you to search lockfiles for tensorlake@0.5.144 and tensorlake-native-*@0.5.144.
Timeline
- October 8, 2026, 01:12 UTC. 0.5.144 appears on npm.
- 01:12–02:54 UTC. Window the advisory gives for the package being live. About one hour and 40 minutes.
- Same day. GHSA-8g63-53c9-65j2 published. Tensorlake points at write-ups from Socket, SafeDep, and Aikido and calls the campaign “Mini Shai-Hulud.”
- What was not hit: the PyPI package, the crates.io package, and the tensorlake CLI.
What the payload did
The malicious version ran during install, from a preinstall hook, not when application code imported the SDK. The advisory says the obfuscated payload harvested credentials from the environment it landed in: GitHub and npm tokens, AWS and GCP credentials, Kubernetes and Vault tokens, SSH and GPG keys, .env files, browser-saved passwords, cryptocurrency wallets, and AI tool and MCP configuration. Stolen tokens were used to republish the payload into other npm packages and repositories the victim could write.
It also installed a service named gh-token-monitor. The advisory says that service deletes the user’s home directory if the stolen GitHub token is revoked. Rotating the token first, which is the usual advice, is the action that trips the wipe. The order in the advisory is the other way around.
The CVSS vector on the advisory is CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H. The user-interaction bit matches the fact that someone has to install the package. Scope changed, which fits a worm that publishes onward with the victim’s token.
How to check if your app is exposed
- On a clean machine, search repos and CI caches:
npm list tensorlake, and grep lockfiles fortensorlake@0.5.144andtensorlake-native-at 0.5.144. Review CI logs for an install that resolved to 0.5.144 between 01:12 and 02:54 UTC on October 8. - If a laptop or a CI runner installed 0.5.144 with install scripts enabled, treat that machine and every credential it could see as compromised. Disconnect it from the network.
- Remove
gh-token-monitorbefore you revoke any GitHub token. Tensorlake’s commands are: on Linux,systemctl --user disable --now gh-token-monitor.service, then delete~/.config/gh-token-monitor/and~/.local/bin/gh-token-monitor.sh. On macOS, boot out~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.user.gh-token-monitor.plistand delete the plist. On Windows, delete thegh-token-monitorscheduled task and%LOCALAPPDATA%\gh-token-monitor\. - From a different, clean machine, rotate every credential the affected machine could access. Then look for unexpected npm releases, commits authored
claude, or a branch nameddependabot/github_actions/format/setup-formatteron repos those tokens could write. - Pin 0.5.143 until 0.5.145 is the version you intend. Rebuild the compromised machine from a trusted image rather than trusting a cleanup script on it.
How Sekrd helps
Sekrd does not watch your laptop’s npm install, and it does not scan the registry. It scans the URL you deploy. If a stolen key from a developer machine later lands in a client bundle, a free scan can still see the patterns it knows: provider key prefixes and client-prefixed secret names. That is secret-pattern-match and js-client-secret-env. A deep scan that you point at an MCP server URL or a GitHub repo reviews tool definitions, which is the configuration class this worm collected. The checklist is MCP server security in 2026.
The useful habit after a worm like this is the same one after the Railway key theft: rotate, then scan the site that ships the new build. Free scan. If the deploy exposes an MCP endpoint, use a deep scan.
Related reading
Frequently asked questions
Which tensorlake version was malicious?
npm version 0.5.144 of tensorlake, published October 8, 2026. The advisory also lists tensorlake-native packages at 0.5.144. Version 0.5.143 and earlier are unaffected. PyPI, crates.io, and the CLI were not affected.
Why did the package have valid npm provenance?
Tensorlake says the attacker pushed malicious code to the repository and published through the project’s own release workflow. Provenance recorded that workflow. It did not record that the maintainer intended the release.
What happens if I revoke the GitHub token first?
The advisory says the gh-token-monitor service deletes the user’s home directory if the stolen GitHub token is revoked. Disable and remove that service before you rotate the token.
How long was 0.5.144 on npm?
About one hour and 40 minutes, from 01:12 to 02:54 UTC on October 8, 2026, according to Tensorlake. Lockfiles and CI logs from that window can still pin it after the registry copy was removed.
Did Tensorlake see the malicious version in production traffic?
The advisory says Tensorlake monitors SDK usage via user-agent headers and had not seen any usage of this version since it was released. That does not measure installs that never called the service.
Sources
Don't ship until you're sekrd
Run a free scan to find the vulnerabilities your AI missed.
Scan Your App Free